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THE BURGER COURT AND INDIVIDUAL




If judicial liberalism is identified with concern for pre-
serving individual rights against governmental encroachment,
the Burger Court has by no means been illiberal. The school
desegregation cases, the judicial assault on sex-based discrimi-
nation, and a host of other decisions attest to its liberalism.
Nor has the addition of four Nixon appointees made judicial
activism a thing of the past. While some Burger Court deci-
sions reflect a willingness to leave controversial social issues to
the political processes,' others-such as the abortion
cases-find the court resolving great social issues with only
the vaguest constitutional warrant. The dominant aspect of
the Court's performance is neither conservatism nor judicial
restraint, but the absence of a strong sense of direction.'
Particularly when compared with the Court during the
Warren years, which is the most commonly used yardstick,
the Burger Court appears uncertain of where it is going. No
ideological bloc dominates the Court. Justice Rehnquist is
consistently more conservative than the others, particularly in
his deference to state legislatures. Justices Brennan and Mar-
shall vote a consistently liberal point of view that includes
equality, individual rights, and governmental aid for the un-
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1. See Howard, The Burger Court: A Judicial Nonet Plays the Enigma Varia-
tions, 43 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 7 (Summer 1980).
2. One recent commentator stated, "Overall, the picture of the Burger Court's
jurisprudence is one of ad hoc, episodic decision-making. Sometimes a more conserva-
tive point of view prevails, sometimes a more liberal. Here there is a decision to abdi-
cate an issue to the political process, there a willingness to rush in and supply a
judicial solution." Howard, Pragmatism, Compromise Marks Court, NAT'L L.J., Feb.
18, 1980, at 28, col. 3.
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derdog. The other justices are scattered at intermediate points
along the ideological continuum, the precise locations varying
with the nature of the issue and apparently over time as well.
A penchant for pragmatism rather than ideology may be a
more appropriate characterization of their judicial behavior.
The overall result is nine strong men pulling in different di-
rections. The splintering effect of ideological diversity might
be mitigated by agreement on common principles of constitu-
tional interpretation or even by a strong commitment to stare
decisis, but in recent years there has been precious little of
either." It is understandable that such a Court seems uncer-
tain of its institutional direction. 4
Another circumstance, largely beyond the control of the
Court, greatly magnifies the impact of the Court's pragmatism
and ideological heterogeneity. Though some justices might be
philosophically inclined toward judicial restraint, the litiga-
tion explosion of recent decades demands that the Court con-
sider a wide range of disputes that in bygone decades would
have been resolved in the political arena. Once the civil rights
groups demonstrated that political losers might become win-
3. Maltz lists 47 cases decided from 1960 to 1979 where the Supreme Court
overruled a previous decision-23 in the last ten years of the Warren Court and 24
since Chief Justice Burger assumed office. His list "does not include those instances
in which the Court has harmonized its decisions with earlier case law only by a
strained reading of prior cases, or where the Court has simply ignored precedent
which strongly suggested a contrary result." Maltz, Some Thoughts On The Death Of
Stare Decisis In Constitutional Law, 1980 Wis. L. REv. 467, 494-96. This contrasts
with 28 precedents overruled by the Supreme Court from the founding of the Repub-
lic to 1932, as tabulated by Justice Brandeis in Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co.,
285 U.S. 393, 407-11 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,dissenting). Of the recent decline of stare
decisi§, Maltz comments, "It seems fair to say that if a majority of the Warren or
Burger Court has considered a case wrongly decided, no constitutional prece-
dent-new or old-has been safe." Malzt, supra, at 467.
4. The internal differences are reflected in the increased output of separate
opinions by the Burger Court. In its last ten years, the Warren Court produced 1139
full opinions of the Court, 424 concurring opinions, and 866 dissenting opinions. With
the increased number of full opinions, more dissents and concurrences might be ex-
pected, but the Burger Court output has increased more than proportionately. During
the last ten years of the Warren Court, concurring and dissenting opinions exceeded
the number of full court opinions by 13.3%; the figure for the Burger Court was
41.3%. Data are from tables in the Supreme Court survey published annually in the
Harvard Law Review. See also Frank, The Burger Court-The First Ten Years, 43
LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 101 (Summer 1980), which attributes this phenomenon to
slightly different causes. "Partly, the flood of pages is due to clerks turning in law
review articles to their superiors, but the rain of concurrences and dissents is also due
to the absence of time to reason together." Id. at 123-24. Frank also recognizes the
effect of ideological differences. Id. at 128-29.
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ners in the judicial forum, the lesson could not be unlearned.
The litigious society had come to stay. This expanding de-
mand for judicial problem-solving further exaggerates the
centrifugal pressures generated by the Court's lack of consen-
sus on consistent modes of constitutional interpretation, ide-
ology or substance. These conditions help to explain the
somewhat unsteady course of the High Court during the past
decade.
II. INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS: AN APPRAISAL
An established means of assessing the overall record of
past Courts has been to explore their attitude towards indi-
vidual rights. That approach will now be briefly undertaken to
provide necessary reference points for comparison with the
Burger Court's treatment of commercial speech.6 As the fol-
lowing survey shows, the record is one of vacillation and un-
certainty. In addition, the elan and the liberal image of the
Warren Court in this area are missing. Nevertheless, the sta-
tus of individual liberties during the Burger era is far from
the disaster that some critics have alleged.7 The net result
5. Nowak, on the contrary, finds a consistent pattern in the Burger Court's be-
havior. "[A]t least since its transition period ended in 1973 or 1974," it represents a
"Court which is dedicated to the promotion of a libertarian political philosophy." By
"libertarian" he means "a political philosophy which places freedom of the individual
above values of egalitarianism or fairness .... Today the position is often called
conservatism and associated with economists as often as philosophers." Nowak, Fore-
word: Evaluating the Work of the New Libertarian Supreme Court, 7 HASTINGS
CONST. L. Q. 263, 284-85 (1980). For another attempt to find a pattern in the deci-
sions, see Marks & Greenwood, The Burger Court and Substantive Rights, An Ana-
lytical Approach, 57 U. DET. J. URB. L. 751 (1980).
6. At first blush the characterization of commercial speech as a species of "indi-
vidual" rights may appear anomalous, since commercial advertising in the United
States is primarily the province of business corporations. The characterization, how-
ever, is appropriate for a number of reasons. Corporations have long been treated as
"persons" within the meaning of the fourteenth amendment guarantees of due pro-
cess and equal protection. See Santa Clara County v. Southern Pac. R.R., 118 U.S.
394 (1886). The Court has recently reaffirmed that corporations as well as natural
persons are protected by first amendment guarantees of individual freedom of expres-
sion. First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978). Natural persons can
and do engage in commercial speech. Furthermore, first amendment protection of
commercial speech, as other speech, is premised not only upon the speaker's rights
but also upon the rights of the recipients. See, e.g., Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v.
Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 756-57 (1976).
7. See, e.g., L. Lzvy, AGAINST THE LAW 439 (1974); L. TRIE, AMERICAN CONSTI-
TUTIONAL LAW (1978); Henry Steele Commager as reported in S. F. Chronicle, Oct. 18,
1978, at 36, col. 1.
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may still fall on the side of increased protection for the rights
of individuals.'
In dealing with school desegregation, the Burger Court
moved well beyond the decision of the Warren years. The
Court implemented desegregation with firmness in the South
and extended the mandate to northern school districts where
purposeful discrimination, historically, was not statutorily
mandated.' This broad advance was tempered by several limi-
tations placed upon the reach of judicial desegreation decrees.
Specifically, the Court banned bussing beyond the boundaries
of the offending district,10 refused to require annual readjust-
ment of school zones to compensate for normal population mi-
gration,11 and refused to order desegregation in any district
unless intentional discrimination was shown."'
In dealing with other questions of racial equality, the
Court's record is somewhat more equivocal. The Court was
generally unwilling to apply judicial scrutiny in situations
where racial minorities appeared to be placed at a disada-
vantage by the effect, but not the purpose, of a local regula-
tion. Thus standardized police examinations' s and local zon-
ing ordinances"4  were upheld though their effect was
8. See, Choper, The Burger Court: Misperceptions Regarding Judicial Re-
straint and Insensitivity to Individual Rights, 30 SYRACUSE L. REv. 767 (1979). With
extensive case citations, Professor Choper argues that the Burger Court has not been
insensitive to individual rights, although less sympathetic than the Warren Court.
Mishkin is even more forthright: "In my judgment, the present Court has shown itself
to be clearly committed on the side of efforts to achieve racial and sexual equality."
Mishkin, Equality, 43 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 51, 64 (Summer 1980). And, more
broadly, Swindler asserts, "This writer believes that the record of the Burger Court,
both in the areas of constitutional decision making and the administration of the
nation's courts, will show more continuity than contrast with the Warren Court."
Swindler, The Burger Court, 1969-1979: Continuity and Contrast, 28 KAN. L. REv.
99, 100 (1979).
9. See Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 443 U.S. 526 (1979); Columbus Bd. of
Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449 (1979); Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267 (1977); Keyes
v. School Dist. No. 1, Denver, Colo., 413 U.S. 189 (1973); Swann v. Charlotte-Meck-
lenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
10. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974). But see Hills v. Gautreaux, 425
U.S. 284 (1976), where the Court ordered an interdistrict remedy upon a finding of
deliberate segregation in housing.
11. Pasadena Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424 (1976).
12. Austin Indep. School Dist. v. United States, 429 U.S. 990 (1976).
13. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
14. Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977). See
also City of Memphis v. Greene, 101 S. Ct. 1584 (1981), where, absent discriminatory
intent, the Court upheld a street closing that incidentally disadvantaged a black
neighborhood.
COMMERCIAL SPEECH
disproportionately to exclude minorities from public service
and from certain residential neighborhoods.1" In a situation of
"reverse discrimination," the Court used the equal protection
clause to outlaw racial quotas favoring minorities in medical
school admission policies, but not to prevent the consideration
of race as a factor in admissions."6 In contrast to this equivo-
cation, the Court was generous in upholding statutory prefer-
ences for minorities regarding employment,7 voting rights, 8
and procurement contracts for federally funded local public
works."1
The sex discrimination cases demarcate another area
where the Burger Court substantially broadened the constitu-
tional protection of individual rights. By elevating sex-based
classifications to a level requiring heightened judicial scrutiny,
the Burger Court by judicial fiat accomplished much of what
equal rights proponents hope to do through a constitutional
amendment. 20 The early Burger Court decision of Reed v.
Reed," invalidating an Idaho law giving preference to male
applicants for letters of administration, was the first Supreme
Court decision to hold a sex-based classification in violation of
the equal protection clause. This initial commitment to sexual
equality was reiterated in'decisions invalidating sex-based
classifications involving military benefits,22 minimum age for
the purchase of intoxicants," age of majority,"2 jury selec-
15. The search for discriminatory purpose had long preceded the Burger Court.
See Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880).
16. University of California Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). See also
Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971), where the closing of public swimming
pools in Jackson, Mississippi, following a court order to desegregate, was held not to
violate equal protection.
17. United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 u.S. 193 (1979); Franks v. Bowman
Transportation Co., 424 U.S. 474 (1976).
18. City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156 (1980); United Jewish Organi-
zations v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144 (1977). But see City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55
(1980).
19. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
20. "Nearly eight years after its submission to the states, the ERA has yet to be
adopted, but the effort to obtain an interpretation of the equal protecton clause
prohibiting gender discrimination by government has been sufficiently successful to
raise a serious question whether adoption of the ERA would serve any but a symbolic
purpose. Significantly, the doctrinal development has occurred entirely during the
past decade." Sandalow, Federalism and Social Change, 43 LAW & CoNTEP. PROB.
29, 31-32 (Summer 1980).
21. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
22. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
23. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
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tion,25 adoption laws, 6 award of alimony, 7 management of
community property, 2  and entitlement to various public ben-
efits.2' Employment discrimination against pregnant women
was also struck down. 0 In Title V 1" cases, the Court invali-
dated height and weight standards for prison guards as dis-
criminatory 2 and banned discrimination in awarding retire-
ment benefits.3 The few sex-based classifications that have
survived the Court's heightened scrutiny have generally
shown preference to women. 4
The sex discrimination cases show a degree of consistency
unusual for the Burger Court. Perhaps more typical are the
equal protection decisions relating to alienage and illegiti-
macy. In a 1971 decision, Graham v. Richardson," the Burger
24. Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975).
25. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975).
26. Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979).
27. Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979).
28. Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455 (1981).
29. Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313 (1977); Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199
(1977); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975).
30. Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U.S. 136 (1977); Turner v. Department of
Employment Security, 423 U.S. 44 (1975); Board of Educ. v. La Fleur, 414 U.S. 632
(1974). But see Geduldig v. Aiello, 414 U.S. 1011 (1974), where exclusion of pregnancy
from a disability benefits program was held not to be gender-based discrimination
but merely an exclusion from coverage. See also General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S.
125 (1976).
31. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) (1976).
32. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977).
33. City of Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702
(1978). In Manhart, the Court required the pension fund to award equal benefits to
men and women in disregard of actuarial tables showing that women, as a class, live
longer and therefore receive pension payments for a longer time than men; see also
Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976), involving male employees of the state of
Connecticut.
34. See, e.g., Michael M. v. Superior Court of Sonoma County, 450 U.S. 464
(1981) (upheld statutory rape statute applicable only to men); Parham v. Hughes, 441
U.S. 347 (1979) (mother but not father may sue for wrongful death of illegitimate
child); Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787 (1977) (immigration preference to natural mothers
of illegitimate children who were U.S. citizens); Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313
(1977) (female preference in computing old age benefits); Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419
U.S. 498 (1975) (relaxed mandatory retirement regulations for women); Kahn v.
Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974) (widow's, but not widower's, property tax exemption).
Not all regulations giving preference to women have been upheld. See, e.g., Wengler
v. Druggists Mutual Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142 (1980) (death benefits); Orr v. Orr, 440
U.S. 268 (1979) (award of alimony); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (minimum
age to drink 3.2 beer). See also Personnel Adm'r. of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256
(1979), where the Court upheld a veterans' preference statute, admittedly discrimina-
tory against women in its effects, because no discriminatory purpose was found.
35. 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
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Court held that classifications based on alienage are inher-
ently suspect and subject to strict judicial scrutiny. There, the
Court struck down a state law denying welfare benefits to
aliens. Subsequently the Court invalidated state laws exclud-
ing non-resident aliens from the practice of law,36 from per-
manent employment in the state classified service, s and from
eligibility for state scholarships." Recent decisions, however,
carved out an exception to strict scrutiny by permitting the
states "to exclude aliens from participation in its democratic
political institutions."39 Under this exception, aliens were de-
nied the right to be employed as New York state troopers
40
and as teachers in New York state public schools.4' Such deci-
sions mark a retreat from strict scrutiny, but only in terms of
a departure from the high standard set by the Burger Court in
Graham.42
The Court has pursued an uncertain course in dealing
with illegitimacy. The Court's wavering approach is attributa-
ble to its intermittent desire to accord illegitimate children a
greater degree of protection from discriminatory state action
than that afforded by a mere rationaltiy requirement, juxta-
posed with its refusal to label illegitimate children as a sus-
pect class.43 The failure of the Court to articulate the proper
standard of review for classifications based on illegitimacy has
led to irreconcilable holdings. In Labine v. Vincent, the Court
permitted the rights of acknowledged illegitimate children to
be subordinated to those of legitimate children in matters of
intestacy, while in Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.,
the death benefit claims of illegitimate children could not be
so subordinated.4 5 Similarly, while New York may deny an il-
legitimate child the right of intestate succession from the
36. In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973).
37. Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973).
38. Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1 (1977).
39. 413 U.S. at 648. This exclusion is known as the Dougall exception.
40. Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291 (1978).
41. Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68 (1979).
42. In contrast to state legislation, the Court has applied an extremely deferen-
tial standard of review to congressional enactments relating to aliens, on the theory
that constitutional responsibility for regulating the status of aliens is committed to
the political branches of the national government. See Matthews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67
(1976).
43. Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495 (1976).
44. Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532 (1971).
45. Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972).
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child's father in the absence of a judicial order of filiation is-
sued during the father's lifetime,' 6 Illinois may not deny an
illegitimate child the right to inherit by intestacy from the
child's father.47
The abortion and contraception cases revealed the
Court's most liberal and active posture as substantive due
process was resurrected to protect certain non-economic, per-
sonal liberties. Even here, however, the Court struggled to
find limits to the newly found rights of privacy and autonomy.
The Warren era decision of Griswold v. Connecticut8 initi-
ated this development with its discovery of emanations from
the Bill of Rights that barred states from penalizing the use of
contraceptives. The Burger Court gave momentum to the con-
cept by overturning a criminal conviction for the distribution
of contraceptives, 4  and then vastly expanded the rights of
privacy and autonomy in a series of abortion cases beginning
with Roe v. Wade.60 The Burger Court found the Constitution
to prohibit most state regulation of abortions prior to the
third trimester, 1 including state requirements concerning res-
idence, use of an accredited hospital and approval by a hospi-
tal staff committee,52 consent of parent or husband, 8 and
state efforts to protect, by means of criminal penalties, a po-
tentially viable aborted fetus.54 The Court, however, fell short
of finding a constitutional right to a publicly funded
abortion.5
The rights of privacy and autonomy were applied outside
the narrow area of abortion and contraception to other as-
46. Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259 (1978).
47. Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1976).
48. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
49. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972). The Court subsequently held that
a state might not ban distribution of contraceptives even to unmarried minors. Carey
v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
50. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
51. Id.
52. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
53. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979); Planned Parenthood of Mo. v. Dan-
forth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976). Contra, H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398 (1981), where the
Court, relying on dicta in Bellotti, upheld a Utah statute requiring a physician to
"notify, if possible," the parents or guardian prior to any proposed abortion for an
immature and dependent minor.
54. Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379 (1979).
55. Williams v. Zbaraz, 448 U.S. 358 (1980); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297
(1980); Poelker v. Doe, 432 U.S. 519 (1977); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977); Beal
v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438 (1977).
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pects of family relations. Privacy grounds were used to strike
down an East Cleveland zoning law that forbade a grand-
mother from sharing her home with two grandsons who were
first cousins. 6 A similar rationale supplemented the Court's
equal protection reasons for invalidating a Wisconsin prohibi-
tion on marriage by any resident failing to meet current child
support obligations.5 7 The Court was cautious in probing the
outer limits of these privacy and autonomy guarantees, and
protection has thus far been denied to homosexual relation-
ships, 58 adultery,59 and policemen's personal preferences in
hair styles.10
If the abortion cases represent the Burger Court's liberal
activism at its peak, the state action cases illustrate the na-
dir-a clear reversal of the Warren era trend toward expan-
sive interpretation of what conduct is sufficiently state-con-
nected to come within the protection of the fourteenth
amendment." Criminal justice is frequently cited as another
area of decline for personal liberties in the Burger era,62 but
all the cases do not point the same way. Lack of direction,
rather than hostility to the rights of the accused, is a better
description of the cases.6 8 The same is true of voting
56. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
57. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
58. Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney, 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975), aff'd
mem., 425 U.S. 901 (1976).
59. Hollenbaugh v. Carnegie Free Library, 436 F. Supp. 1328 (W.D. Pa. 1977),
aff'd mem., 578 F.2d 1374 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1052 (1978).
60. Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238 (1976).
61. Compare Amalgamated Food Employees Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza,
Inc., 391 U.S. 308 (1968) and Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966) with Flagg Bros.,
Inc., v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978) and Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976) and
Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974) and Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner,
407 U.S. 551 (1972) and Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972) and Evans
v. Abney, 396 U.S. 435 (1970). For a discussion of this development, see Schwartz, A
"New" Fourteenth Amendment: The Decline of State Action, Fundamental Rights,
and Suspect Classifications under the Burger Court, 56 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 965
(1980).
62. See, e.g., Burkoff, The Court That Devoured The Fourth Amendment: The
Triumph of an Inconsistent Exclusionary Doctrine, 58 OR. L. REV. 151 (1979);
Chase, The Burger Court, the Individual and the Criminal Process: Directions and
Misdirections, 52 N.Y.U.L. REv. 518 (1977); Choper, The Burger Court: Mispercep-
tions Regarding Judicial Restraint and Insensitivity to Individual Rights, 30 SYRA-
cusE L. REV. 767 (1979); Nowak, Foreword-Due Process Methodology in the Pos-
tincorporation World, 70 J. CRIM. L. & C. 397 (1979); Schultz, The Jury Redefined: A
Review of Burger Court Decisions, 43 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 8 (autumn 1980);
Stone, The Miranda Doctrine in the Burger Court, 1977 SuP. CT. REV. 99.
63. For illustrative decisions upholding rights of the accused see, e.g., Edwards
19811
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rights" and the interests of the poor. 5 Rather than rolling
back previous advances on a broad front, the Burger Court
carried on a vacillating search for reasonable limits with con-
siderable sensitivity to fact variations.
The Burger Court's directional uncertainty is also appar-
ent in addressing the first amendment freedom of expression.
Genuine concern for first amendment values is evident, but
countervailing considerations sometimes prevail in the balanc-
ing process." More often than not, the Court has shown solici-
v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981) (police may not initiate questioning after accused
requests counsel); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980) (warrant required to
enter home for routine felony arrest); Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85 (1979) (unautho-
rized search); Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499 (1978) (unauthorized search and
seizure); Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475 (1978) (right of codefendant to separate
counsel where potential conflict of interest); Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973)
(probation violator right to hearing); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972) (parole
violator right to hearing).
64. To illustrate this ambivalence in dealing with voting rights, the Court dur-
ing its 1979 term held that at-large election of city commissioners in Mobile, Ala-
bama, did not unfairly dilute the voting strength of Blacks in violation of the four-
teenth and fifteenth amendments. City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980). Yet,
on the same day, the Court upheld a provision of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 under
which the Attorney General disapproved a Rome, Georgia, shift to at-large election of
city commissioners because in his judgment the change would abridge the rights of
black voters. City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156 (1980). For earlier cases
placing limitations on the right to vote, or sanctioning departures from strict equality,
see Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24 (1974); Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410 U.S. 752
(1973); Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist., 410 U.S. 719
(1973); Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315 (1973); Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124
(1971). Other decisions strike down such limitations or departures from equality. See
Chapman v. Meir, 420 U.S. 1 (1975); O'Brien v. Skinner, 414 U.S. 524 (1974); Kusper
v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51 (1973); White v. Weiser, 412 U.S. 483 (1973); White v.
Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973); City of Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204 (1970);
Hadley v. Junior College Dist., 397 U.S. 50 (1970).
65. San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973), upholding
the local property tax as a method of school financing, despite great taxable property
disparities between school districts, made clear the Burger Court's unwillingness to
establish wealth as a suspect classification. This view is perpetuated in other deci-
sions, such as Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) and Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464
(1977), denying the right to a publicly funded abortion. The Court has, however, in-
validated a number of statutory fees or penalties placing hardships on indigents. See
Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709 (1974) (primary election filing fees); Lindsey v.
Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972) (appeal bond in a tenant eviction proceeding); Tate v.
Short, 401 U.S. 395 (1971) (imprisonment beyond the statutory term for inability to
pay a fine); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971) (court fees incident to a di-
vorce action).
66. In appraising "the effects of the Burger Court's decisions on the system of
freedom of expression," Professor Emerson concludes that "because of the Court's
predilection for ad hoc balancing, its failure to take proper account of the dynamics
of suppression, and its unwillingness to develop innovative doctrines in response to
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tude for the rights of solicitors and canvassers,6 7 demonstra-
tors," and picketers.69 Nevertheless, the legitimate legislative
objectives of the nondiscriminatory regulation of access to
nontraditional public forums such as schools, transportation
facilities, and military bases, were found to outweigh the in-
terests of free speech in several decisions. Accordingly, Mr.
Grayned's conviction under an anti-noise ordinance for partic-
ipating in a mass demonstration in front of a high school was
upheld, 0 while Dr. Spock was found to have no right to dis-
tribute peace pamphlets on an army base 7 1 and State Repre-
sentative Harry Lehman could not force the City of Shaker
Heights to place his political advertisement on municipal bus-
ses. 7 2 The Burger Court also recognized and extended the
right to use offensive language in public, 78 even in circum-
stances where the words might be regarded as personally abu-
sive or even threatening. 4 On the other hand, in the special
environment of the air waves, the Federal Communication
changing needs, the system has become less effective at serving its underlying val-
ues." Emerson, First Amendment Doctrine and the Burger Court, 68 CALIF. L. REV.
422, 423 (1980). He does see the Burger Court, however, as fully accepting "the tradi-
tional set of values underlying the first amendment." Id. at 440. For a view that the
Burger Court has largely preserved and consolidated first amendment gains of the
Warren era, although breaking relatively little new ground, see Cox, The Supreme
Court, 1979 Term, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1980).
67. Village of Schaumberg v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 444 U.S. 620
(1980); Hynes v. Mayor of Oradell, 425 U.S. 610 (1976); Organization for a Better
Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415 (1971).
68. National Socialist Party of America v. Village of Skokie, 432 U.S. 43 (1977);
Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611 (1971); Bachellar v. Maryland, 397 U.S. 564
(1970). But see Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972), where the Court
found no right to hold a noisy demonstration adjacent to a school building during
school hours.
69. Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455 (1980); Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408
U.S. 92 (1972).
70. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972).
71. Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976).
72. Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974). The promoters of
the rock musical Hair, however, apparently had a constitutional right to perform for
profit at the Chattanooga municipal theater, despite the judgment of the theater's
managing board that the limited number of available dates should be allotted to
other shows judged more acceptable. Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad 420
U.S. 546 (1975).
73. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971). The Court reversed Cohen's convic-
tion for expressing his antipathy to the draft by means of a four-letter word embla-
zoned on his jacket.
74. Eaton v. City of Tulsa, 415 U.S. 697 (1974); Lewis v. New Orleans, 415 U.S.
130 (1974); Papish v. Board of Curators of Univ. of Mo., 410 U.S. 667 (1973); Gooding
v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972).
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Commission was permitted to censor George Carlin's "seven
dirty words" without running afoul of the first amendment. 8
In two cases of "symbolic expression," the Court refused to
enforce criminal sanctions. One case involved a peace symbol
displayed on the United States flag,7 while in the other case,
a representation of the flag was worn on the seat of the defen-
dant's jeans.7
In the preceding encounters with first amendment values,
the Burger Court took at least two steps forward for each step
backward, if it is assumed that freedom of expression is the
paramount value. 8 In some areas, however, backward steps
may have outnumbered the strides forward. The Court cur-
tailed, but did not abandon, the use of overbreadth analysis to
invalidate statutory strictures on free speech.79 Retrenching
from the Warren Court decade, the Court now purports to re-
quire not just overbreadth but "substantial overbreadth." 80
Also, first amendment access to private property was nar-
rowed by decisions repudiating the right of individuals to
picket or pamphleteer in a privately owned shopping center.8"
The right to engage in obscene expression was constricted by
denying first amendment protection to sexually oriented
75. FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
76. Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405 (1974).
77. Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566 (1974). See also Wooley v. Maynard, 439
U.S. 705 (1977), where the Court upheld the rights of a Jehovah's Witness couple not
to display the slogan "Live Free or Die," imprinted on their New Hampshire license
plates.
78. The assumption abviously begs the central question the Court is compelled
to decide when free speech interests collide with other important constitutional and
social values. No Court has given priority to free speech values at all costs. At the
very least, the right of "falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing a panic" has not
yet been conceded. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
79. The overbreadth doctrine holds that "a litigant whose own activities are un-
protected may nevertheless challenge a statute by showing that it substantially
abridges the First Amendment rights of other parties not before the court." Village of
Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 444 U.S. 620, 634 (1980).
80. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973). See also Civil Serv. Comm'n v.
National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548 (1973). For the Burger Court's use of
overbreadth to strike down offending legislation, see Village of Schaumburg v. Citi-
zens for a Better Environment, 444 U.S. 620; Erznoznik v. Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205
(1975); Lewis v. New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130 (1974).
81. Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976); Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551
(1972). The Warren Court had discovered such a right in Amalgamated Food Em-
ployees Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308 (1968). But see Pruneyard
Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980), where the Court held that federal
guarantees of property rights did not bar states from granting broader access to shop-
ping centers than the first amendment required.
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materials that lack "serious literary, artistic, political, or sci-
entific value," and by permitting obscenity to be judged by
local rather than national community standards.85 The Burger
Court further held that the right to possess obscene matter in
the privacy of one's home8s does not imply a correlative right
to sell, distribute, or otherwise purvey it to others.84
The first amendment rights of publishers and reporters
raised especially difficult balancing problems for the Burger
Court. The decisions turned on the particular facts of each
case and the nature of the asserted right, with no overall clear
sense of direction.85 The Court was unsympathetic to press
claims of a constitutional privilege to withhold information
from courts, grand juries, and law enforcement officials.86 Con-
versely, the Court was very sensitive to claims of prior re-
straint in refusing to enjoin publication of the Pentagon Pa-
pers,87 and in striking down lower court gag orders in criminal
82. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973). See also Ward v. Illinois, 431 U.S.
767 (1977) ("sado-masochistic" materials may be obscene); Splawn v. California, 431
U.S. 595 (1977) (evidence of pandering is relevant to the determinaion of obscenity);
Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153 (1974) (juries do not have unbridled discretion to
find material obscene).
83. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
84. U.S. v. Reidel, 402 U.S. 351 (1971). The Court also permitted municipalities
to regulate erotic, but not necessarily obscene, entertainment by means of zoning or-
dinances. Young v. American Mini Theaters, 427 U.S. 50 (1976), but only if the re-
striction was adequately justified. Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61
(1981).
85. Defamation cases have also raised difficult first amendment questions. In
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), the Warren Court constitution-
alized the law of defamation as it relates to public officials by requiring the defamed
official to prove "actual malice" on the part of the defendant. Three years later the
New York Times rule was extended to "public figures" as well as public officials.
Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967); Associated Press v. Walker, 388
U.S. 130 (1967). The Burger Court extended the rule to defamation suits by private
individuals, Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971), but subsequently
recanted that extension in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974), and has
since limited Butts and Walker by definitionally narrowing the class of "public
figures." Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, Inc., 443 U.S. 157 (1979); Hutchinson v.
Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111 (1979); Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976); and Gertz
v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323. The Gertz decision made suits by private plain-
tiffs somewhat more difficult, however, by requiring a showing of fault and by limiting
damages.
86. Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153 (1979) (television producer's claim of privi-
lege against pretrial discovery in a defamation suit); New York Times Co. v. Jas-
calevich, 439 U.S. 1304 (1978) (reporter testifying in a criminal trial); Zurcher v.
Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978) (search of campus newspaper office); Branzburg
v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972) (reporter testifyng before a grand jury).
87. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
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proceedings."8 Demands by the press for access to government
information resulted in a mixed bag of decisions. The Burger
majority upheld state and federal rules prohibiting press in-
terviews with specific prison inmates,89 but granted relief to
reporters seeking access to informaiton about jail conditions
generally.90 Fine lines were drawn with respect to press cover-
age of judicial proceedings. A trial court may constitutionally
bar the press and public from pre-trial hearings on suppres-
sion of evidence in a murder case,91 but the first amendment
requires that the criminal trial itself be open to the public
"absent an overriding interest" to the contrary." In its most
recent term, the Court held that a criminal defendant's rights
were not violated by state laws permitting television cameras
in the courtroom.9
III THE COMMERCIAL SPEECH CASES
The preceding broad survey of Burger Court decisions
reveals a Court genuinely c6ncerned with individual rights,
yet more inclined than its predecessor to balance competing
claims and values. In the more detailed discussion of commer-
cial speech which follows, the same dynamics are apparent,
including the agonizing over competing values, the hesitation,
the leap forward, and the vacillating search for viable limits
on the application of a constitutional guarantee. Despite the
rivers of printer's ink already devoted to law review commen-
tary on commercial speech,9 the topic remains of current in-
terest because the constitutional law is still in a state of fluid
development. In the present context, a reexamination is of ad-
ditional value because of the light it throws on the Burger
Court's mode of operating.
88. Oklahoma Publishing Co. v. District Court, 430 U.S. 308 (1977); Nebraska
Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
89. Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843 (1974); Pell v. Procunier, 417
U.S. 817 (1974).
90. Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1 (1978).
91. Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368 (1979).
92. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
93. Chandler v. Florida, 449 U.S. 560 (1981).
94. The legal indexes reveal more than 135 entries dealing with some aspect of
commercial speech for the period of 1976-1980.
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A. The Commercial Speech Exception
The concept of commercial speech first emerged in
Supreme Court jurisprudence as an exception to the coverage
of the first amendment. Traditionally, speech guarantees were
associated with political expression rather than economic ac-
tivity. 5 It was not until Valentine v. Chrestensen6 that the
High Court specifically excluded commercial advertising from
the ambit of the first amendment. The unlikely subject matter
of the decision was a criminal conviction for circulating hand-
bills advertising tours of an old former navy submarine
moored in New York harbor. Local law forbade distribution of
any "advertising matter whatsoever in or upon any street,'
97
and the Court upheld the conviction against a first amend-
ment attack because the amendment had no application to
"purely commercial advertising."" Thus was launched the
"commerial speech" exception." The following year, without
reference to Valentine v. Chrestensen, the Court reversed the
conviction of Jehovah's Witnesses for door-to-door distribu-
tion of leaflets advertising religious meetings.100 Nevertheless,
in a 1951 decision, Breard v. Alexandria,"' the Court again
95. See, e.g., W. BERNS, THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN
DEMOCRACY (1976); Z. CHAFEE, JR., FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES (1941); A.
MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM (1948); BeVier, The First Amendment and Political
Speech: An Inquiry Into the Substance and Limits of Principle, 30 STAN. L. REV.
299 (1978); Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND.
L. J. 1 (1971). Over the years, however, the first amendment guarantee of freedom of
expression has come to be associated with other values not necessarily involving the
individual's relationship with the polity. Professor Emerson categorizes "the tradi-
tional values underlying the system of freedom of expression" as follows: (1) individ-
ual self-fulfillment; (2) the advance of knowledge and the discovery of truth; (3) par-
ticipation in decisionmaking by all members of society; and (4) maintenance of the
proper balance between stability and change." Emerson, supra note 62, at 423. For a
fuller discussion of these values, see T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF Ex-
PRESSION (1970); T. EMERSON, TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT
(1966). Emerson, however, does not believe commercial speech is entitled to first
amendment protection. Emerson, supra note 66, at 481.
96. 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
97. Id. at 53 n.1.
98. Id. at 54-55.
99. Justice Douglas, who participated in the unanimous decision of Valentine v.
Chrestensen, commented some sixteen years later, "The ruling was casual, almost
offhand. And it has not survived reflection." Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S.
498, 514 (1959) (Douglas, J., concurring). Justice Douglas was several years ahead of
the Court in reaching this conclusion.
100. Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943).
101. 341 U.S. 622 (1951).
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applied the Chrestensen doctrine in upholding a local ordi-
nance barring door-to-door solicitations of magazine subscrip-
tions. The Jehovah's Witness case was distinguished as having
involved "no element of the commercial." 102
Although no subsequent case denied first amendment
protection because the speech in question was "purely com-
mercial," several opinions observed that the first amendment
was applicable because the communications were not strictly
commercial in nature. 08 The seminal case in this group, New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan,'4 involved a libel action resulting
from a paid political advertisement by a southern civil rights
group. In finding the advertisement protected, the Court took
great pains to distinguish it from Chrestensen. The political
advertisement at issue, Justice Brennan stated,
was not a "commercial" advertisement in the sense in
which the word was used in Chrestensen. It communi-
cated information, expressed opinion, recited grievances,
protested claimed abuses, and sought financial support on
behalf of a movement whose existence and objectives are
matters of the highest public interest and concern....
That the Times was paid for publishing the advertise-
ment is as immaterial in this connection as is the fact
that newspapers and books are sold. 08
This argument, however, cut both ways. If it preserved the
concept of a commercial speech exception, it also distin-
guished a class of paid advertisements that fell outside the
exception.
The Burger Court's first significant encounter with com-
mercial speech doctrine was Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Human
Relations Commission.106 The Court, in a 5-4 decision, upheld
a city regulation of employment discrimination that prohib-
ited the publication of help-wanted advertisements in sex-des-
ignated columns. Justice Powell, speaking for the Court, ac-
102. Id. at 642-43.
103. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266 (1964); Thomas v. Col-lins, 323 U.S. 516, 533 (1945); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 111 (1943);
Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413, 417 (1943).
104. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
105. Id. at 265, 266.
106. 413 U.S. 376 (1973). Earlier the Court had summarily affirmed an FCC ban
on radio and television advertising of cigarettes. Capitol Broadcasting Co. v. Mitchell,333 F. Supp. 582 (D.D.C. 1971), affd sub nom. Capitol Broadcasting Co. v. Acting
Attorney General, 405 U.S. 1000 (1972).
972 [Vol. 21
COMMERCIAL SPEECH
cepted the New York Times Co. v. Sullivan rationale that
"speech is not rendered commercial by the mere fact that it
relates to an advertisement. '"10 1 The advertisement in Pitts-
burgh Press, however, "did no more than propose a commer-
cial transaction," 10 8 and therefore could not be distinguished
from Chrestensen. Justice Powell hinted broadly that the en-
tire commercial speech concept might bear reexamination, but
not in this context:
Any First Amendment interest which might be served by
advertising an ordinary commercial proposal and which
might arguably outweigh the governmental interest sup-
porting the regulation is altogether absent when the com-
mercial activity itself is illegal and the restriction on ad-
vertising is incidental to a valid limitation on economic
activity.'09
Thus the initial Burger Court response was to invoke the
commercial speech exception while questioning its broader ap-
plicability. This limited application of the rule still evoked
strong dissent. Chief Justice Burger called the regulation an
"impermissible prior restraint"110 and complained that the de-
cision for the first time extended the commercial speech ex-
ception "to reach the layout and organizational decisions of a
newspaper." ' Justices Stewart and Blackmun felt Chresten-
sen should be limited to its own facts-government regulation
of the use of streets to promote gainful activity1 12-while Jus-
tice Douglas was ready to give commercial speech the full pro-
tection of the first amendment. 8
This initial Burger Court encounter with the commercial
speech exception may have validated Chrestensen in a very
narrow context, but the questions raised by both Justice Pow-
ell and the dissenters did not augur a bright future for the
doctrine.1 " These intimations of change were reinforced two
107. Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Human Relations Comm'n, 413 U.S. at 384.
108. Id. at 385.
109. Id. at 389.
110. Id. at 396 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
111. Id. at 393.
112. Id. at 401-02 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
113. Id. at 398-99 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
114. Legal scholars also became increasingly critical of the commercial speech
exception. For a much cited critique of that period, see Redish, The First Amend-
ment in the Marketplace: Commercial Speech and the Values of Free Expression,
39 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 429 (1971). For a good review of the commercial speech excep-
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years later in Bigelow v. Virginia,1 5 a 7-2 decision reversing
the conviction of a newspaper publisher whose weekly journal
carried an advertisement for a New York abortion referral
agency in violation of Virginia law. Justice Blackmun distin-
guished Chrestensen on the ground that the Bigelow adver-
tisement went beyond the mere proposal of a commercial
transaction to include factual material of clear interest to the
public." 6 But Justice Blackmun was not content to distin-
guish; he was also determined to undercut. The Chrestensen
holding, he insisted, spoke only to the manner of distributing
commercial advertising. 117 He noted further that the Pitts-
burgh Press opinion would have justified some degree of first
amendment protection for the help-wanted advertisements
had the commercial proposal been legal.118 Indeed, for adver-
tising generally, the relationship of speech to commercial ac-
tivity was just one relevant factor "in weighing the First
Amendment interest against the governmental interest al-
leged."" 9 Justice Blackmun, with dicta, was obviously at-
tempting to place commercial speech within the reach of the
first amendment. Only Justices Rehnquist and White
dissented.
B. Repudiation of the Exception
The signals emitted by Pittsburgh Press and Bigelow
proved an accurate portent. During its next term, the Court
repudiated the commercial speech exception in a decision
striking down a Virginia law against price advertisement of
presciption drugs. The practical impact of the decision was
great, but the intellectual leap was small. As Justice Black-
tion as developed to 1975, see DeVore & Nelson, Commercial Speech and Paid Ac-
cess to the Press, 26 HASTINGS L. J. 745 (1975). For other critical comment, see, e.g.,
Freedman, Bulls, Bears, Fat Cats and Consumerism, 1 Civ. LIB. REV. 125 (1974);
Note, The Commercial Speech Doctrine: The First Amendment at a Discount, 41
BROOKLYN L. REV. 60 (1974); Note, Commercial Speech-An End in Sight for
Chrestensen, 23 DE PAUL L. REV. 1258 (1974); Comment, The Right to Receive and
the Commercial Speech Doctrine: New Constitutional Considerations, 63 GEo. L. J.
775 (1975); Comment The First Amendment and Consumer Protection: Commercial
Advertising as Protected Speech, 50 OR. L. REV. 177 (1971).
115. 421 U.S. 809 (1975). •
116. Id. at 822.
117. Id. at 819. This was the position taken by the Stewart dissent in Pitts-
burgh Press, in which Justice Blackmun agreed in part.
118. Id. at 821.
119. Id. at 826.
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mun acknowledged, "the notion of unprotected 'commercial
speech' . . . [had] all but passed from the scene"'20 with the
Bigelow decision. The Virginia Pharmacy case offered a bet-
ter context for repudiating the Chrestensen doctrine, because
the facts were more squarely within the Pittsburgh Press defi-
nition of commercial speech as an advertisement that pro-
posed no more than a commercial transaction. The question,
posed directly, was answered directly; purely commercial
speech is protected by the first amendment.
The Court supported this conclusion by a painstaking ex-
amination of competing interests. Because the action was
brought by a consumer group rather than by pharmacists, the
Court gave special emphasis to the first amendment rights of
recipients of information.121 The Court also found first
amendment interests that reached farther. The. advertiser, as
well as the consumer, has a strong economic interest in the
free flow of commercial information-the advertiser to pro-
mote sales, and the consumer to learn where his scarce dollars
are best spent.'22 Society also has a collecitve interest:
So long as we preserve a predominantly free enterprise
economy, the allocation of our resources in large measure
will be made through numerous private economic deci-
sions. It is a matter of public interest that those decisions,
in the aggregate, be intelligent and well informed. To this
end, the free flow of commercial information is
indispensable.123
As a persistent advocate of balancing in first amendment situ-
ations, Justice Plackmun proceeded to weigh these individual
and societal interests against state justifications for the adver-
tising ban. The societal interests, relating mostly to the al-
leged impact on the professionalism of licensed pharmacists,
were found wanting.
120. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425
U.S. 748, 759 (1976). ,
121. Id. at 756-57.
122. Id. at 762-63.
123. Id. at 765. The Court also found such information was
indispensable to the formation of intelligent opinions as to how that sys-
tem ought to be regulated or altered. Therefore, even if the First
Amendment were thought to be primarily an instrument to enlighten
public decisionmaking in a democracy, we could not say that the free
flow of information does not serve that goal.
1981]
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Chief Justice Burger concurred in the judgment with a
separate opinion, stressing the difference between advertising
largely pre-packaged prescription drugs and the advertising of
services by doctors or lawyers, in an obvious attempt to hold
the learned professions immune from the implications of Vir-
ginia Pharmacy.124 In a separate concurrence, Justice Stewart
detailed reasons why government regulation of false or mis-
leading advertising was still permissible. 15 Only Justice Rehn-
quist dissented. e Justice White, who had joined Justice
Rehnquist in a Bigelow dissent, was now with the majority.1 27
This near-unanimity was made possible by a part VI of
the opinion, which hedged and qualified the decision in typi-
cal Burger Court fashion. The Court, it appears, was not hold-
ing that commercial speech "can never be regulated in any
way.' 1 28 Justice Blackmun listed several permissible forms of
regulation. The list, although not exhaustive, included the
regulation of the time, place and manner of speech, false or
misleading advertising, advertisement of illegal transactions,
and regulation relating to unspecified "special problems of the
electronic broadcast media."'' Perhaps even more significant
were the extensive qualifications appearing in the footnotes to
part VI. The Court explicitly recognized that commercial
speech has "commonsense differences" from other varieties, so
that "a different [and lesser] degree of protection is neces-
sary."' 130 Because the truth of commercial speech is more eas-
ily verified and more durable, there is less likelihood of "chil-
ling" protected speech, less need to tolerate inaccurate
statements, and possibly less need to forego prior restraints.'3
Furthermore, the analysis of Virginia Pharmcky may not gov-
ern advertising by physicians and lawyers because of the
greater "possibility for confusion and deception.' ' 3 2 What be-
gan as a clear-cut rejection of the commercial speech excep-
tion was converted to a half-way measure leaving a multitude
124. Id. at 773-75.
125. Id. at 775-81.
126. Id. at 781.
127. Justice Douglas had retired prior to this decision and his successor, Justice
Stevens, did not participate. Id. at 773.
128. Id. at 770.
129. Id. at 773.
130. Id. at 771-72.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 773 n.25.
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of unresolved questions and a great potential for confusion.
Opportunities to clarify the dimensions of the newly-ex-
tended first amendment coverage were presented in three
cases decided during the 1976 term. In Linmark Associates,
Inc. v. Township of Willingboro," ' the Court was asked
whether a township might constitutionally ban "For Sale" and
"Sold" signs from residential property for the purpose of
stemming a perceived "white flight" from a racially integrated
community. The Court's answer was a unanimous no.134 The
interests of buyer, seller, and society in the free flow of com-
mercial information were as strong as the first amendment in-
terests protected in Virginia Pharmacy. Moreover, the town-
ship's interest in the ordinance was not sufficiently compelling
when weighed with other interests. The Court rejected the ar-
gument that the ordinance was a valid time, place, or manner
regulation. The regulation did not leave open satisfactory al-
ternative channels of communication, and the ban was di-
rected to message content-not the size, shape, or other fea-
tures of the sign.13 5 In its discussion of the "content" element
of the regulation, the Court invoked by implication a first
amendment standard no different from that applied to ordi-
nary speech.3 6 The force of the implication was undercut,
however, by Justice Marshall's reaffirmation of the Virginia
Pharmacy footnote alluding to the "commonsense differ-
ences" between commercial speech and other speech which
permitted "a different degree of protection."
1 3 7
In the second commercial speech decision of the 1976
term, Carey v. Population Services International," the
Court invalidated a New York law regulating the distribution
of contraceptives and prohibiting their advertisement. Relying
on Virginia Pharmacy, Justice Brennan's majority opinion
held that truthful advertising could not be completely sup-
pressed because of its content, again implying a single stan-
dard for all kinds of speech. " 9 Separate opinions by other jus-
133. 431 U.S. 85 (1977).
134. Justice Rehnquist did not participate. Id. at 98.
i35. Id. at 93-94.
136. Id. 96-97.
137. Id. at 98.
138. 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
139. The Court also found that the case fell within the Bigelow ruling because it
"related to activity with which, at least in some respects, the State could not inter-
fere." Id. at 701 (quoting Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v.Virginia Citizens Con-
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tices, however, tended to weaken the force of the holding.
Justice Powell agreed that the advertisement of contracep-
tives could not be completely suppressed, but insisted that
state regulations might be designed to minimize the impact of
advertising on children. 10 Justice Stevens, joined by Justice
White, also argued that first amendment protection "does not
deprive the State of all power to regulate such advertising in
order to minimize its offensiveness," including restrictions on
content."" The Chief Justice dissented without opinion, and
Justice Rehnquist's dissent dealt only with the right to dis-
tribute contraceptives.
C. Protection of Attorney Advertising
The third case of the 1976 term, Bates v. State Bar of
Arizona,42 was unquestionably the most difficult. In a 5-4 de-
cision, the Court, speaking through Justice Blackmun, held
that a state could not prohibit truthful newspaper advertising
"concerning the availability and terms of routine legal ser-
vices." 43 The question of lawyer advertising had been specifi-
cally reserved in Virginia Pharmacy, and the divided Court
extended first amendment protection to this hitherto closely
regulated area with some trepidation. The holding was care-
fully limited to the type of advertising at issue. It was specifi-
cally narrowed to exclude "advertising claims relating to the
quality of legal services... [and] problems associated with in-
person solicitation of clients." ' The Court further indicated
that even truthful advertising of routine services might be
subjected to a requirement of warning or disclaimer as to
quality." The Court also used Bates as a vehicle for limiting
overbreadth analysis by specifically declining to apply it to
professional advertising. Since protected commercial speech
was unlikely to be crushed or chilled by overbroad regulation,
"the justificaiton for the application of overbreadth analysis
applies weakly, if at all, in the ordinary commercial
surner Council, 425 U.S. at 760).
140. Id. at 711-12 (Powell, J., concurring).
141. Id. at 717-18 (Stevens, J., concurring).
142. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
143. Id. at 384.
144. Id. at 366.




Sharp divisions within the Court were manifest in three
opinions submitted by the four dissenting justices. The Chief
Justice,'47 Justice Powell," 8 and Justice Stewart, argued that
Virginia Pharmacy was not controlling because legal services
were vastly different from the dispensing of pre-packaged,
standardized, name-brand drugs. Price advertisement of legal
services was likely to be inherently misleading. Legalizing
some but not all price advertising would also create unman-
ageable problems of enforcement. Justice Rehnquist vehe-
mently reiterated his opposition to extending any first amend-
ment protection to commercial speech." 9
The limits of attorney advertising were further explored
in two cases decided the following term. In Ohralik v. Ohio
State Bar Association,'" the court unanimously held that a
state might discipline a lawyer for in-person solicitation of cli-
ents for pecuniary gain under cirumstances likely to pose dan-
gers of fraud, undue influence, intimidation, or overreaching.
In a second decision, In re Primus,"' the Court held that a
lawyer working with the American Civil Liberties Union could
not be disciplined for writing a letter soliciting non-paying cli-
ents for the Amercian Civil Liberties Union (ACLU). Primus
did not involve purely commercial speech because clients were
not solicited for profit. The Court found Primus had acted out
of political conviction in support of ACLU civil liberties objec-
tives, and not for financial gain. In fact, the Court treated the
letter of solicitation as falling within a line of decisions pro-
tecting rights of political expression and association,'" thus
invoking core first amendment rights calling for exacting scru-
146. Id. at 380.
147. Id. at 386 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
148. Id. at 389 (Powell, J., joined by Stewart, J., concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part).
149. Id. at 404 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
I continue to believe that the First Amendment speech provision, long
regarded by this Court as a sanctuary for expressions of public impor-
tance or intellectual interest, is demeaned by invocation to protect ad-
vertisements of goods and services. I would hold quite simply that the
appellants' advertisement, however truthful or reasonable it may be, is
not the sort of expression that the Amendment was adopted to protect.
Id. at 405.
150. 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
151. 436 U.S. 412 (1978). Only Justice Rehnquist dissented.
152. For the leading case, see NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
19811
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
tiny. '5 The Court reviewed the commercial speech prece-
dents, however, because the case involved solicitation of cli-
ents by lawyers which, in other contexts, was likely to have
commercial implications.
Ohralik fell squarely within the realm of commercial
speech, but Ohralik's behavior was such an egregious violation
of accepted standards that the decision could provide little
guidance in borderline situations. Ohralik, on his own initia-
tive, approached two eighteen year old girls, one of whom was
in the hospital in traction, and obtained contingent fee agree-
ments to represent them in personal injury claims. Although
both discharged him before he had performed substantial ser-
vices, he subsequently sued for his contingent fee. In a settle-
ment with one of the girls, he obtained one-third of her ulti-
mate recovery. Upon complaint by the two girls to the Bar
Association, Ohralik was stispended from the practice of law.
Justice Powell delivered a unanimous opinion upholding the
suspension.
Briefly stated, the rationale was as follows. Commercial
speech is entitled to less first amendment protection than
noncommercial speech.""' Within the former category, in-per-
son solicitation is entitled to less protection than public ad-
vertising of the kind approved in Bates.55 Furthermore, the
state has a "compelling" interest in regulating in-person solic-
itation because of the possibility of "fraud, undue influence,
intimidation, overreaching, and other forms of 'vexatious con-
duct.' "" Mr. Ohralik was properly disciplined because his
conduct created the potential for such harm whether or not
153. In re Primus, 436 U.S. at 427-33, 438-39. In Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar
Ass'n, decided the same day, the Court characterized its holding in Primus as follows:
"We hold today in Primus that a lawyer who engages in solicitation as a form of
protected political association generally may not be disciplined without proof of ac-
tual wrongdoing that the State constitutionally may proscribe." 436 U.S. at 462 n.20.
154. To require a parity of constitutional protection for commercial and non-
commercial speech alike could invite dilution, simply by a leveling process, of the
force of the Amendment's guarantee with respect to the latter kind of speech. Rather
than subject the First Amendment to such devitalization, we instead have afforded
commercial speech a limited measure of protection, commensurate with its
subordinate position in the scale of First Amendment values, while allowing modes of
regulation that might be impermissible in the realm of noncommercial expression.
Id. at 456.
155. Id. at 455, 457, 459.
156. Id. at 462.
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there was actual injury.1 57 On its face, the decision left unan-
swered the question of whether a state could ban all in-person
solicitation by lawyers for pecuniary gain or whether such
conduct could be proscribed only under circumstances having
potential for abuse. This was clarified in Primus, decided the
same day, where Justice Powell characterized Ohralik as hold-
ing that "the State may proscribe in-person solicitation for
pecuniary gain under circumstances likely to result in adverse
consequences .... "158
D. Recent Decisions: The Search for a Rule
Through its 1980 term, the Court did not rule again on
lawyer advertising, but in 1979, Friedman v. Rogers' " pro-
vided an opportunity to examine a Texas statute prohibiting
the practice of optometry under a trade name. In a 7-2 deci-
sion, the Court held that this form of commercial speech
might be banned as potentially deceptive. A trade name, the
Court reasoned, "conveys no information about the price and
nature of services offered by an optometrist until it acquires
meaning over a period of time by associations formed in the
minds of the public between the name and some standard of
price or quality."160 Further, because such "ill-defined associa-
tions" are subject to manipulation by the trade name users to
mislead the public, the use of trade names is not entitled to
first amendment protection.161 This decision involved no obvi-
ous departure from Virginia Pharmacy since the Court held
open the right to regulate deceptive and misleading advertis-
ing, but no deceptive use of trade names by Rogers had been
found, and the threat of deception did not seem serious.112
The Court, of course, was balancing interests, a rough and
ready process at best. In striking the balance, the Court
seemed less deferential of first amendment interests than in
157. 'Id. at 464-68.
158. In re Primus, 436 U.S. at 434. Justice Marshall's concurring opinion in
Ohralik took a similar position. Solicitation could be proscribed only "under circum-
stances-such as those found in this record-presenting substantial dangers of harm
to society or the client independient of the solicitation itself .... " 436 U.S. at 470
(Marshall, J., concurring).
159. 440 U.S. 1 (1979).
160. Id. at 12.
161. Id. at 12-13.
162. Id. at 19 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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the earlier cases. 163
In Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Ser-
vice Commission,' 4 a commercial speech decision made dur-
ing the 1979 term, the Court struck down a state prohibition
of advertising by electric utilities to promote the use of elec-
tricity. The decision was unanimous, except for Justice Rehn-
quist's dissent, but only a bare majority agreed on the ratio-
nale. In an attempt to reduce commercial speech rules to a
more manageable formula, Justice Powell presented a four-
part analysis for testing the validity of government regulation
of commercial speech:
At the outset, we must determine whether the expression
is protected by the First Amendment. For commercial
speech to come within that provision, it at least must con-
cern lawful activity and not be misleading. Next, we ask
whether the asserted governmental interest is substantial.
If both inquiries yield positive answers, we must deter-
mine whether the regulation directly advances the gov-
ernmental interest asserted, and whether it is not more
extensive than is necessary to serve that interest."'
Applying this schema, the Court found that Central Hudson's
advertisements were not inaccurate or related to unlawful ac-
tivity, and hence were within the first amendment's coverage.
The asserted government regulatory interests in conserving
energy and promoting fair utility rates were found to be sub-
stantial, and this called for inquiry into the linkage between
the state interests and the advertising ban. The relationship
with the utility's rate structure was found to be tenuous, but
the interest in energy conservation was felt to be directly ad-
vanced by the Commission order. The ban did not survive the
final hurdle, however, since the regulation for the complete
suppression of advertising was broader than necessary. "In
163. The tone of the decision is captured in a footnote to Justice Powell's analy-
sis of previous commercial speech cases:
Because of the special character of commercial speech and the relative
novelty of First Amendment protection for such speech, we act with
caution in confronting First Amendment challenges to economic legisla-
tion that serves legitimate regulatory interests. Our decisions dealing
with more traditional First Amendment problems do not extend auto-
matically to this as yet uncharted area.
Id. at 10 n.9.
164. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
165. Id. at 566.
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the absence of a showing that more limited speech regulation
would be ineffective," the Court refused to approve the Public
Service Commission's order. 6 The first amendment was thus
extended to cover promotional advertising of a closely regu-
lated, state-created corporate utility having a monopoly
within its service area.
As a distillation of prior decisions, the four-part test fell
somewhat short of a perfect fit. The requirement that the reg-
ulation be "not more extensive than necessary" to serve the
governmental interest was a more stringent test than anything
previously stated. The Court cited Primus for the proposition
that speech restrictions must be narrowly drawn, 167 but
Primus concerned political expression and association, not
commercial speech. Bates,1 s8 Virginia Pharmacy,8 9 and Ca-
rey1 70 were also cited for their dicta suggesting that a more
narrowly drawn statute, falling short of complete suppression,
might withstand the Court's scrutiny. But that is a far cry
from the Central Hudson rule invalidating any regulation of
commercial speech that is "more extensive than is necessary"
or one that does not "directly advance" a "substantial" gov-
ernmental interest. In dissenting, Justice Rehnquist observed,
with some justification, that the test elevated "the protection
accorded commercial speech that falls within the scope of the
First Amendment to a level that is virtually indistinguishable
from that of noncommercial speech.
1'
In a concurring opinion joined by Justice Brennan, Jus-
tice Blackmun alleged a poor fit for the opposite reasons that
the opinion undercut guarantees of commercial expression es-
tablished in prior cases. The intermediate level of scrutiny
used by the Court was "appropriate for a restraint on com-
mercial speech designed to protect consumers from misleading
or coercive speech, or a regulation related to the time, place,
or manner of commercial speech." The four-part test was not
a proper rule "when a State seeks to suppress information
166. Id. at 571.
167. Id. at 565.
168. 433 U.S. at 384.
169. 425 U.S. at 773.
170. 431 U.S. at 701-02.
171. 447 U.S. at 591 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Powell still insisted,
however, that the Constitution "affords a lesser protection to commercial speech than
to other constitutionally guaranteed expression." Id. at 563.
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about a product in order to manipulate a private economic
decision that the State cannot or has not regulated or out-
lawed directly.""17 In that situation the precedents dictated
that commercial speech should be treated on a par with non-
commercial speech. 173
At the close of its 1980 term, the Court announced one
more decision implicating commercial speech, Metromedia,
Inc. v. City of San Diego.174 The decision, however, ultimately
turned on general first amendment issues rather than the
commercial speech aspects of the case. At issue was a San Di-
ego ordinance banning, with specified exceptions, outdoor ad-
vertising display signs. 175 A plurality of four, speaking through
Justice White, concluded that the ordinance satisfied the
four-part Central Hudson test insofar as it related to commer-
cial advertising. In the Court's opinion, the ordinance directly
advanced substantial governmental interests in traffic safety
and esthetics and was no broader than necessary to serve
these interests. Nevertheless, the ordinance was declared
facially invalid because it reached "too far into the realm of
protected speech. 1 7 6 Specifically, noncommercial messages
were banned in some locations where commercial billboards
were permitted and some types of noncommercial messages
were allowed as exceptions to the ban. Insofar as the city per-
mitted billboards at all, it could not favor commercial over
noncommercial messages or prefer some types of noncommer-
cial messages to others. 17 7 The plurality expressly refused to
decide whether a total prohibition of all outdoor advertising
would be consistent with the first amendment.17 8 Justices
Brennan and Blackmun concurred in the judgment because
172. Id. at 573 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
173. Id. at 577-79.
174. 453 U.S. 490 (1981).
175. Early Supreme Court cases sustaining regulation of billboards did not
reach first amendment issues. See Packer Corp. v. Utah, 285 U.S. 105 (1932); St.
Louis Poster Advertising Co. v. City of St. Louis, 249 U.S. 269 (1919); Thomas Cu-
sack Co. v. City of Chicago, 242 U.S. 526 (1917). More recently the Court rejected
several first amendment challenges to local regulation of billboards but chose to do so
by summary aflirmance rather than plenary consideration. See Lotze v. Washington,
444 U.S. 921 (1979); Newman Signs, Inc. v. Helle, 440 U.S. 901 (1979); Suffolk Out-
door Advertising Co. v. Hulse, 439 U.S. 808 (1978); Markham Advertising Co. v.
Washington, 393 U.S. 316 (1969).
176. 453 U.S. at 521.
177. Id. at 512-17.
178. Id. at 515.
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they believed the ordinance was unconstitutional in its appli-
cation to commercial and noncommercial speech."1 9 Justices
Burger, Rehnquist and Stevens dissented, finding the ordi-
nance consistent with the first amendment as to both com-
mercial and noncommercial advertising.
180
IV. DOCTRINAL EVOLUTION AND UNCERTAINTY
The Central Hudson decision remains the Court's latest
reformulation of the law of commercial speech. In view of the
conflicting analyses in that case, and its inconclusive applica-
tion by only a plurality in Metromedia, it obviously leaves
some unanswered questions. 18' The tenor of past decisions
does not suggest, however, that the forebodings of Justice
Blackmun are likely to be realized. From Breard, which up-
held a local ordinance barring door-to-door magazine sales, to
Virginia Pharmacy, the only decision actually denying protec-
tion to commercial speech was Pittsburgh Press. Moreover,
the local regulation in Pittsburgh Press did not ban the help-
wanted advertisements, but only prohibited their placement
in sex-designated columns. In only two cases since Pittsburgh
Press has protection been denied. Ohralik was a particularly
outrageous case of in-person solicitation of legal business,
fraught with great potential for overreaching. In the other,
Friedman v. Rogers, the majority persuaded itself that the use
of trade names by optometrists was sufficiently deceptive to
warrant suppression by the state.
In view of this record, the likelihood is not great that any
governmental attempt to suppress commercial speech will be
validated unless the case fits one of the specified exceptions to
179. Id. at 524 (Brennan, J., concurring).
180. Id. at 540-70 (Burger, C.J., Rehnquist, J., Stevens, J., dissenting.)
181. Justices Stevens and Brennan saw the ban on "promotional advertising" as
reaching a range of communication extending well beyond commercial speech. Thus
the issue was not commercial speech, but rather an attempt by the Public Service
Commission to suppress ordinary speech without any clear and present danger to
justify it. 447 U.S. at 579-80 (Stevens, J., concurring). Cf. First Nat'l Bank of Boston
v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978), where the Court invalidated a Massachusetts law
prohibiting corporations from spending money to influence public decisions on issues
not directly related to the business of the corporation; Consol. Edision Co. v. Public
Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530 (1980), where the Court struck down a New York regula-
tion prohibiting a public utility from including a statement of its views on public
issues in the monthly billing envelopes sent to its customers. While the rights of cor-
porations rather than private persons were involved, the speech at issue was political
rather than commercial.
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first amendment protection. As articulated by the Court at va-
rious times, these include time, place, and manner regulations,
misleading or deceptive speech, speech relating to an unlawful
activity, "coercive" speech (a code word presumably designat-
ing the kind of expression associated with Ohralik's offensive
conduct), and regulation of the electronic broadcast media.
The major Burger Court decisions relating to commercial
speech appear in Table 1, which shows the voting position of
each justice on each case and indicates by asterisks the au-
thorship of majority, concurring, and dissenting opinions. The
table includes Primus and Metromedia, which discussed the
commercial speech precedents, but ultimately were decided as
cases of noncommercial speech. The voting pattern suggests a
distinct commitment of the Court to continue first amend-
ment protection in this area. Eight of the eleven decisions
point clearly in that direction. The other three cases simply
illustrate the tendency of the Court to move with caution and
recognize the differences in fact situations.
TABLE 1
VOTING ALIGNMENT ON COMMERCIAL SPEECH CASES
DECIDED BY THE BURGER COURT
Pittsburg Bigelow Viginia Linmark Carey Bates Primus Ohralik Friedman Central Metro-
Press Pharmacy Hudson media
Burger Y... Y Y** Y N... N*** Y N N Y N...
Brennan N Y Y Y Y* Y NP NP N Y*. Y..
Stewart Y... Y Y** Y Y N Y N N Y Y
White N N Y Y Y.* Y Y N N Y Y.
Marshall N Y Y Y* y y Y.* N** Y Y Y
Blackmun Y*** Y. Y* y y Y* Y** N Y*** Y.* Y
Powell N* Y Y Y Y. N".. Y. N* N' Y. Y
Rehnquist N N".. N... NP N*** N*.. N"' N N N..' N"*.
Stevens - - NP Y Y** Y Y N N Y" N"'.
Douglas Y*** V - - = - - - - -
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.Court (or Plurality) Opinion Y = Vote in favor of First Amendment Protection
Concurring Opinion N - Vote against First Amendment Protection
-Dissenting Opinion NP = Not participating
- - Not a member of the Court
The pattern of voting and decision outcomes gives a useful
overall view of the Burger Court's approach to commercial
speech, but it suggests more consensus than actually exists. A
better index of doctrinal dispute is the number of separate
opinions. In eleven cases there are thirty separate dissenting
or concurring opinions, a ratio well above the Burger Court's
generally high rate of opinion proliferation.'8 The five sepa-
rate opinions produced in each of the two most recent cases,
Central Hudson, and Metromedia, indicate that the doctrinal
differences are not diminishing with time.
Nor are the problems presented in commercial speech
cases diminishing.188 Despite the efforts of Justice Powell in
Central Hudson to set forth a precise standard of review, the
scope of first amendment protection accorded commercial
speech still remains uncertain. May truthful, "non-coercive"
commercial speech be totally banned because of its content?
Central Hudson seems to say that it can be suppressed if the
regulation directly advances a substantial governmental inter-
est and no narrower measure will suffice. This does not, how-
ever, altogether resolve the uncertainty. The Burger Court has
yet to sustain a total ban directed at the content of truthful
commercial speech, and the state regulation in Central Hud-
son did not survive the Powell formula. Justice Rehnquist
may well have been correct in his assessment that the test
"leaves room for so many hypothetical 'better' ways that any
ingenious lawyer will surely seize on one of them to secure the
invalidation of what the state agency actually did."' "
If so, the rule may simply mean that a total ban could be
sustained in theory, but in practice it never will be. In all like-
lihood, this formula would not command a majority in a situa-
tion where it could be used to sustain a content-based ban on
182. See note 4 supra.
183. For thoughtful discussion of problems raised by the commercial speech
cases, written before the Central Hudson decision, see Barrett, "The Uncharted
Area"-Commercial Speech and the First Amendment, 13 U.C.D. L. Rlv. 175
(1980).
184. 447 U.S. at 600 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The plurality in Metromedia,
however, thought the San Diego ordinance could survive the test in Central Hudson.
453 U.S. at 512.
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commercial speech. Formulating a rule in the context of pro-
tecting expression is one thing, but applying it to achieve the
opposite purpose is quite another."' The potential instability
of the Central Hudson formula is increased by its tenuous re-
lation to previous decisions, at least as applied to the total
suppression of speech. What the precedents say in this regard
is by no means clear; clearly they do not add up to the Cen-
tral Hudson formula. Virginia Pharmacy, Linmark, Bates,
and Ohralik all use a balancing process, weighing first amend-
ment interests against the states interest in the regulation, to
determine whether protection should be granted. In the bal-
ancing process, the Court has examined the relationship be-
tween the asserted state purposes and the proposed regula-
tion.' If the relationship is tenuous, the state interest in the
regulation is correspondingly weakened. Looking for the con-
nection between the two is consistent with Central Hudson,
but Justice Powell's test leaves little room for balancing inter-
ests. The first amendment interest is not weighed in the bal-
ance, but simply assumed to be taken into account by the
level of scrutiny implicit in the formula. With that as a given,
the Court focusses first on the state interest to see if it is sub-
stantial, and then on the regulation to determine if it directly
advances the interest and is no more extensive than necessary.
If Central Hudson fails to reflect the balancing process
implicit in the precedents,s it also ignores the numerous sug-
185. Justices Brennan, Blackmun, and Stevens, who concurred separately,
would be very reluctant to sustain such an application of the rule. Justice Marshall,
who apparently acquiesced in the opinion, would surely share their reluctance. Justice
Rehnquist, judging by past opinions, would undoubtedly be happy to sustain a ban
on commercial speech, but he would surely not endorse the Powell formula. With thepresent composition of the Court, the Powell formula thus appears viable only for the
purpose of protecting commercial speech against total suppression by state
regulation.
186. See, e.g., Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council, Inc., 425 U.S. at 769; Linmark Assoc. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. at
95; Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. at 368, 373-74.
187. The balancing process is explicit in some instances. In Bates, after a de-
tailed examination of the state interest in banning lawyer advertising, the Court con-
cluded: "In sum, we are not persuaded that any of the proffered justifications rise to
the level of an acceptable reason for the suprression of all advertising by attorneys."
433 U.S. at 379. In Ohralik, the Court concluded that "the balance struck in Bates
does not predetermine the outcome in this case. The entitlement of in-person solicita-
tion of clients to the protection of the First Amendment differs from that of the kind
of advertising approved in Bates, as does the strength of the State's countervailing
interest in prohibition." 436 U.S. at 455.
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gestions that commercial speech is entitled to full first amend-
ment protection against content-based suppression of truthful
information. In Virginia Pharmacy, the Court engaged in ap-
praisal of competing interests, but then virtually ignored the
balancing process in reaching its conclusion:
What is at issue is whether a State may completely sup-
press the dissemination of concededly truthful informa-
tion about entirely lawful activity, fearful of that informa-
tion's effect upon its disseminators and its recipients.
Reserving other questions, we conclude that the answer to
this one is in the negative.188
These same rationales were present in the Linmark deci-
sion. After careful consideration of competing claims, the
Court concluded that the township interest in banning "For
Sale" signs must bow before first amendment interests be-
cause the ordinance does little to achieve its ostensible pur-
pose of keeping Willingboro an integrated community."8 " But
does all the balancing discussion really matter? Apparently
not much, since the "constitutional defect" in the ordinance is
"far more basic."' 90 Truthful commercial speech cannot be
suppressed because of its content. As elaborated by Justice
Marshall, Willingboro's concern in adopting the ordinance
was not with any commercial aspect of "For Sale"
signs-with offerors communicating offers to offer-
ees-but with the substance of the information communi-
cated to Willingboro citizens. If dissemination of this in-
formation can be restricted, then every locality in the
country can suppress any facts that reflect poorly on the
locality, so long as a plausible claim can be made that dis-
188. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425
U.S. at 773. But this strong statement was immediately weakened by a disclaimer.
"We stress that we have considered in this case the regulation of commercial adver-
tising by pharmacists. Although we express no opinion as to other professions, the
distinctions, historical and functional, between professions, may require consideration
of quite different factors." Id. at 773 n.25. Was the Court giving full protection to
truthful commercial speech, or just balancing? In Linmark, the Court indicated that
the Virginia Pharmacy decision rested on a dual foundation. The Virginia prohibi-
tion of prescription drug advertising was unconstitutional "because we were unper-
suaded that the law was necessary to achieve this objective [maintaining professional-
ism], and were convinced that in any event, the First Amendment disabled the State
from achieving its goal by restricting the free flow of truthful information." 431 U.S.
at 95.
189. Id. at 95-96.
190. Id. at 96.
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closure would cause the recipients of the information to
act "irrationally." Virginia Pharmacy Bd. denies govern-
ment such sweeping powers.191
The same "full protection" approach is found in Carey v.
Population Services International. In the portion of the opin-
ion dealing with advertising, Justice Brennan dispensed with
the balancing process and simply quoted from the closing par-
agraph of the Virginia Pharmacy opinion: "[A] State may not
'completely suppress the dissemination of concededly truthful
information about entirely lawful activity,' even when that in-
formation is categorized as 'commercial speech.' ",19' The more
recent cases-Bates, Primus, Ohralik, and Friedman-do not
contain such sweeping endorsements of full protection for
truthful commercial speech, but that argument is nowhere re-
pudiated, and it is ignored in the Central Hudson formula.
Central Hudson also does little to clarify the standard of
review when time, place, and manner regulations are applied
to commercial speech. Is it the same standard as for ordinary
speech, or a lesser one? Again, the precedents are ambiguous.
Linmark'93 and Bates " suggest that the standard may be the
same for all varieties of speech. Primus'9" and Ohralik, 9' to
the extent that the challenged regulations deal with time,
place, or manner, indicate otherwise. Central Hudson does
not directly address the issue, but if the Court's formula ap-
plies to regulations of time, place, and manner as well as to
content, the concept of a narrowly drawn statute directly serv-
ing a substantial governmental interst looks very much like
the ordinary standard for such regulations.1 97
191. Id. The parallel with ordinary speech was heightened by a quotation of
Justice Brandeis' often repeated lines from Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377
(Brandeis, J., concurring). "If there be time to expose through discussion the false-
hood and fallacies, to avert the evil by the processes of education, the remedy to be
applied is more speech, not enforced silence. Only an emergency can justify repres-
sion." Quoted in Linmark Assos. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. at 97.
192. 431 U.S. at 700.
193. 431 U.S. at 93-94.
194. 433 U.S. at 384.
195. 436 U.S. at 434.
196. Id. at 457. See also Barrett, supra note 183, at 188-94.
197. See, e.g., Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940); Saia v. New York,
334 U.S. 558 (1948). In dicta, the Court said that commercial speech, unlike noncom-
mercial expression, is not subject to the doctrine of prior restraint. Friedman v. Rog-
ers, 440 U.S. at 10; Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council, 425 U.S. at 771-72 n.24. The same is true of the overbreadth doctrine. Vil-
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Other elements of the Central Hudson test are more in
line with previous decisions. It retains the proposition, enunci-
ated in Pittsburgh Press and repeated in Virginia Pharmacy,
that speech proposing an illegal transaction may be prohib-
ited. In this respect, commercial speech is unquestionably less
favored than ordinary speech. Advocating a violation of the
law may be proscribed only "where such advocacy is directed
to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely
to incite or produce such action." 1"
False and misleading commercial advertising is also de-
nied the protection that accrues to noncommercial speech. Al-
though untruthful expression has never been protected for its
own sake,199 first amendment protection of ordinary speech
has not been limited to truthful statements.2 00 False advertis-
ing of goods and services, however, has consistently been held
subject to governmental regulation. Before Virginia Phar-
macy, deceptive advertising could be regulated because it was
"commercial." Since Virginia Pharmacy, it has remained sub-
ject to regulation because it is untruthful. In the commercial
speech cases, the Court has reasoned that advertising qualifies
for first amendment protection because of its informational
function. "Consequently, there can be no constitutional objec-
tion to the suppression of commercial messages that do not
accurately inform the public about lawful activity."2 0' Both
Friedman20 2 and Ohralik2 "3 indicate that the government may
ban forms of expression that are only potentially deceptive or
misleading. The portion of the Central Hudson test that ex-
lage of Schaumberg v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 444 U.S. 620, 633 (1980);
Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. at 10 n.9; Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. at
436 n.20; Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. at 380-81. Central Hudson said nothing
about prior restraint but alluded to the nonapplicability of overbreadth. 447 U.S. at
565 n.8.
198. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).
199. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974); Konigsberg v. State
Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 49 (1961).
200. "Authoritative interpretations of the First Amendment guarantees have
consistently refused to recognize an exception for any test of truth-whether admin-
istered by judges, juries or administrative officials .... " New York Times v. Sulli-
van, 376 U.S. 254, 271 (1964). False statements, however, may constitutionally give
rise to liability for defamation and invasion of privacy. See Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974), and cases discussed therein.
201. Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Comm'n, 447 U.S.
at 563.
202. 440 U.S. at 13, 15-16.
203. 436 U.S. at 464-65.
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cludes deceptive commercial speech from the shelter of the
first amendment thus represents a settled rule and a broad
consensus on the Court. 04
Whatever its contribution to clarifying the scope of pro-
tection afforded commercial speech, Central Hudson did little
to resolve the definition of commercial speech.205 The Court
offered two definitions, but did not analyze either or discuss
their interrelationship. The first definition was given in the
coniext of asserting that the state ban on utility advertising
was limited to commercial speech. The Court defined com-
mercial speech as "expression related solely to the economic
interests of the speaker and its audience. ' 20 6 The second defi-
nition appeared quite casually in a reference to the oft-re-
peated "commonsense distinction" between "speech proposing
a commercial transaction" and other kinds of speech.20
Neither definition included new and helpful criteria for distin-
guishing commercial from ordinary speech, but the first defi-
nition appeared to be a substantial, if perhaps unintended,
broadening of the concept.20 The troublesome question of de-
fining commercial speech is certain to recur in future
decisions.
V. CONCLUSION
This article has not been primarily concerned with the
desirability of extending first amendment protection to com-
mercial speech, although many opinions have been expressed
204. Neither Central Hudson nor any of its predecessors is clear on the stan-
dard required to satisfy the Court that the potential for deception is great enough to
take speech out of the first amendment.
205. For incisive analysis of this question, see Barrett, supra note 183, at 201-
07; Farber, Commercial Speech and First Amendment Theory, 74 Nw. U. L. REv.
372, 407 (1979); Comment, First Amendment Protection for Commercial Advertising:
The New Constitutional Doctrine, 44 U. Cm. L. REV. 205 (1976).
206. 447 U.S. at 561.
207. Id.
208. Justice Stevens called it "too broad" because it encompassed
speech that is entitled to the maximum protection afforded by the First
Amendment. Neither a labor leader's exhortation to strike, nor an econ-
omist's dissertation on the money supply, should receive any lesser pro-
tection because the subject matter concerns only the economic interests
of the audience. Nor should the economic motivation of a speaker qual-
ify his constitutional protection; even Shakespeare may have been moti-
vated by the prospect of pecuniary reward.
Id. at 579-80 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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on that subject. For years prior to Virginia Pharmacy, legal
commentators had advocated that such a step be taken."'
The abandonment of the commercial speech exception was
generally welcomed by legal scholars, 10 and it still commands
wide support as an extension of first amendment freedoms."'1
Dissenting voices however, have been raised. Some have ex-
pressed the fear that the traditional values of free expression
are demeaned, diluted, or stretched beyond recognition by ap-
plication to the economic marketplace."1' Some also have
urged that the new commercial speech doctrine, like the old
economic due process, is unwise and unjustified interference
with state regulation of economic affairs.2'8 Without joining
that debate this article has raised concerns of a different na-
ture. The Court has abandoned a reasonably well-settled
"commercial speech exception" without thus far being able to
articulate a consistent, coherent first amendment theory in its
place. The reach of the amendment is now broader, but its
contours are fuzzier.
The larger problem of disciplined constitutional interpre-
tation is not peculiar to the Burger Court. Complaints of in-
consistency, lack of principled decision-making, and general
ad-hocery have been directed at previous Courts."' The prob-
lem is exacerbated by the litigation explosion and by the in-
tellectual and ideological diversity of the present Court. Look-
209. See note 114 supra.
210. E.g., Rotunda, The Commercial Speech Doctrine in the Supreme Court,
1976 U. ILL. L. F. 1080; Schiro, Commercial Speech: The Demise of a Chimera, 1976
SuP. CT. REV. 45; Comment, First Amendment Protection for Commercial Advertis-
ing: The New Constitutional Doctrine, 44 U. Cni. L. REv. 205 (1976).
211. E.g., Canby, The Commercial Speech of Lawyers: The Court's Unsteady
Course 46 BROOKLYN L. REV. 401 (1980); Neuborne, A Rationale for Protecting and
Regulating Commercial Speech, 46 BROOKLYN L. REV. 437 (1980); Note, Can't Get
Enough of That Sugar Crisp: The First Amendment Right To Advertise To Chil-
dren, 54 N.Y.U. L. REV. 561 (1979); Comment, Commercial Speech and the Limits of
Legal Advertising, 58 OR. L. REV. 193 (1979).
212. E.g., Baker, Commercial Speech: A Problem in the Theory of Freedom, 62
IOWA L. REV. 1 (1976); Emerson, supra note 66; Heller, The End of the "Commercial
Speech" Exception-Good Riddance or More Headaches for the Courts?, 67 Ky. L. J.
927 (1979); Jackson & Jeffries, Commercial Speech: Economic Due Process and the
First Amendment, 65 VA. L. REV. 1 (1979).
213. E.g., Baker, supra note 212; Jackson & Jeffries, supra note 212; Note, Re-
uniting Commercial Speech and Due Process Analysis: The Standard for Deceptive-
ness in Friedman v. Rogers, 57 TEx. L. REV. 1456 (1979).
214. As Professor Howard observed, "Americans seem content to abide a fair
degree of contradiction and of ad hoc evolution in their law. The Burger Court is heir
to this tradition." Howard, supra note 1, at 28.
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ing through the cases we do not see a "conservative Nixon
Court" busily undoing the work of the Warren years. Rather,
we see a Court that has encountered unusual difficulty in its
efforts to interpret constitutional guarantees of individual
rights with principled consistency.
